Abstract: This paper extends the literature on switching costs by considering what happens when retailers and manufacturers are separate entities and some customers are locked in with retailers.
1.

Introduction
This paper examines the endogenous formation of vertical contractual arrangements between producers and retailers when consumers face switching costs. Previous works on switching costs assume that the product is sold directly by the manufacturer to the public, and no mention is made to upstream/downstream activities as they are pooled together.
1 On the other hand, the distinction between manufacturers and retailers is central to an extensive literature on vertical arrangements that has focused on several issues, including the elimination of successive mark-ups, or the attempt to raise rivals' costs. However, no reference is made to the fact that market power may arise from the existence of consumer switching costs. 2 This paper would like to draw a line between these two streams in the literature by exploring the implications switching costs have for vertical relationships.
Consider a framework where two upstream firms can supply two downstream firms and firms compete after having made their vertical contractual choice. In the presence of consumer switching costs, an integrated firm would face a typical trade-off. If it invests in market share by charging a low price, it attracts customers that will be profitable repeat-purchasers; alternatively the firm can harvest profits by charging high prices to existing customers. When independent retailers sell the product, new factors enter the picture. Manufacturers may face the paradoxical problem of extracting too much surplus from the retailer. If this happens, then the latter is not interested in building a subscriber base, resulting in foregone future profits. This is a case of "dynamic inconsistency", and it is likely that firms would look for a suitable contractual solution. For instance, the problem could be reduced if retailers have the freedom to resort to alternative sources of input supply. This ensures a reservation payoff to the retailer related to what he could get if he supplied the competing manufacturer's product to his customers. Such a reservation payoff depends also on the contract chosen by the rival pair: for example if the rival manufacturer has signed an exclusivity deal, then it cannot supply any other retailer. Alternatively, vertical integration is a candidate to emerge, so that the problem is internalized.
However, it is not clear if independent pairs of firms are able to coordinate on the most profitable contractual choices. I provide a framework suitable for analyzing equilibrium contracts and their properties, with a particular focus on the incentive to invest in market share when long-term contracts are not available.
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The coexistence of vertical relationships and consumer switching costs can be found in the following business examples:
(a) Telecoms. In the telecommunications industry, network operators can sell services directly to the final users or via service providers. Consumption in this industry involves consumer switching costs: if they try to switch network, users may face compatibility problems (additional software or hardware needed), transaction costs (absence of number portability) and contractual costs (e.g.
in mobile telephony, SIM cards are typically locked so that handsets only work on one network).
Customers buy their product directly from the network operator if it has (or is allowed by regulators to have) a retailing division, or from independent service providers who do not own their own network but provide services over other operator's networks.
(b) Durable goods and aftermarkets. Some goods (e.g. a photocopier) are durable and require use with a "consumable" (e.g. toner cartridges). Cartridges may be supplied directly by the manufacturer of the durable good, or by other independent firms. Independent suppliers may be required to carry only one particular cartridge compatible with a particular photocopier. If incompatibility between cartridges is achieved by product design, then the customer is locked with the 'upstream' manufacturer and will need spare parts from a 'downstream' service organization. A similar situation arises with video games designed for a Sony Play-station which cannot be used with a Nintendo games console.
(c) Cars. When replacing an old car with a new car, many customers tend to purchase their car from the same supplier as before. Since in principle it is easy to switch brands, this is seen as an indication of 'psychological' switching costs (e.g. attachment to a brand, or favorable experience with the previous purchase so that uncertainty costs are minimized by purchasing from the same manufacturer). The car itself is not typically purchased directly from the manufacturer but from a car dealer.
(d) Credence goods. These arise in medical services and in areas such as financial advice.
Customers are not good judges of the appropriateness of a particular medical advice or treatment, or of a mortgage or pension product. Some customers are then locked in with a particular doctor or financial adviser. Medical services need a hospital to be carried out.
Financial products are offered by financial institutions. In both cases then, the customer buys advice/treatment from an adviser that may be independent or integrated 'upstream'. In the U.S., treatment providers compete for patients, and under many insurance plans customers have a restricted choice of doctors. Also doctors can sign exclusivity agreements to work only in a given hospital.
(e) Fidelity cards. Frequent-flyer programs are perhaps the most cited example of a product involving switching costs. They allow travelers to earn "airmiles" each time they fly and they incorporate a non-linear element that has the potential to generate switching costs. Airline tickets are often bought via a travel agent that does not necessarily coincide with the airline carrier.
Supermarkets also often employ loyalty programs. Supermarkets are an example of 'downstream' retailers that also need to strike deals in wholesale markets in order to be able to supply final consumers.
These business cases are all very different, but they exhibit two common features: 1) the product involves some sort of consumer switching costs and 2) there is a vertical structure of the manufacturer/retailer type (or primary/secondary markets).
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I propose a three-stage game in order to study what implications switching costs have for vertical relationships in a two-tier industry made of two vertical chains, each consisting of one upstream and one downstream firm. In the first stage (time t = 0), within each vertical chain, the upstream and the downstream firm negotiate over the contract type (e.g. they can integrate or sign an exclusivity deal). After each pair of firms has determined its contract type and has observed the rivals' choice, there is market competition over two periods (t = 1, 2). Two periods of market competition are needed to analyze the basic trade-off in markets with switching costs ("invest" at t =1, then "reap" at t = 2). While the contract type is irreversibly set at t = 0, contract terms (e.g. the input price) are set at t = 1 for the amounts sold at t = 1, and at t = 2 for the amounts sold at t =2. Contract terms are chosen allowing for side payments between the negotiating pairs. Through these modeling assumptions I can get rid of the typical "vertical externality" (e.g. double mark ups) that arises in models with an upstream-downstream structure. I can then concentrate on the problem of "dynamic inconsistency" for the manufacturer/retailer pair. The only type of commitment that can arise in my model is through the choice of contract type.
As discussed above, the main contribution of this paper is to extend the literature on switching costs by considering what happens when retailers and manufacturers are separate entities.
At a more technical level, the contract terms of a vertical chain are chosen through bilateral negotiations, rather than take-it-or-leave-it offers chosen by one of the parties alone as is in most of the literature (typically it is the manufacturer that has this ability). Hence the second contribution is to deal with a non-straightforward compound problem that encompasses two synchronous bargaining processes. The final contribution of the paper arises from the contrast between 'downstream' and 'upstream' switching costs, a distinction that has not been made in the literature before. Switching costs are said to be 'downstream' when it is the change of retailer that matters for the consumer. This is the case, for instance, with service providers or doctors in the illustrative examples above. In other situations, however, it is the manufacturer's brand that matters, hence switching costs occur 'upstream'. This is the case with cars or frequent flyer programs. The distinction as to who 'owns' the customer is important since it improves the bargaining position of the parties and hence affects the distribution of rents that is at the very heart of the problem of dynamic inconsistency analyzed by this study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple upstreamdownstream model. The model is solved in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 deals with two extensions, the case of 'upstream' switching costs and the role played by consumer rational expectations. Section 6 concludes.
The model
The model is a 3-stage upstream-downstream duopoly, in which consumers experience a cost when switching retailers. Prior to trade that takes place in dates 1 and 2, at date 0 a producer matches with one retailer and each matched pair contracts on the specificity of their vertical relationship (e.g.
vertical integration, exclusive dealership, independence, etc.). The vertical contracts are assumed to establish only the relationship-specificity, but not the transfers from a retailer to its upstream supplier.
In date 1, each retailer invests in acquiring its market share, after having bargained over the transfers to its supplier(s). Consumer switching costs introduce a correlation in the market share of each retailer between date 1 and date 2. At date 2, a retailer bargains again over the terms of its supply, and trade occurs again. The details of the model are given below.
Costs and vertical structure. The market comprises two upstream manufacturers indexed by h, k and two downstream retailers, indexed by i, j. In the absence of switching costs, products are homogeneous and can be produced and sold by any pair once a link is established by contractual configurations. One unit of the upstream good is needed to produce one unit of the final good.
Production exhibits constant return to scale. Marginal costs are normalized to zero.
Time structure. The game starts with a contract decision at t = 0, followed by market competition in two periods t = 1, 2.
Demand. Consumption occurs at two points in time. To illustrate, take the case of a durable good (e.g. a razor, a phone, a digital set-top box) used with a complementary non-durable component (e.g. blades, call minutes, TV programs). In the first period (t = 1), myopic 5 consumers buy the durable good bundled with a certain amount of the non-durable component. Consumer's utility is zp if the total price of the bundle is p, where z is uniformly distributed on a support with upper limit a.
Firms compete over the number of customers they supply. When firm (or division) i supplies n i customers, then the resulting price for the bundle is p = a -(n i + n j ).
At t = 2, there is consumption according to a linear demand function. Individual demand of each customer is: x = b -p. 6 Some customers are locked in after the initial purchase (they have infinite switching costs) and some of them are free to change supplier in the second period. Let 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 denote the fraction of customers of the latter type.
The important feature of this demand structure is that the price in the first period determines the total number of customers and these customers continue to consume in the second period.
Notice that the same analytical framework can capture a situation in which some customers die between periods (µ is the exit rate), and are replaced by n uncommitted ones while surviving customers are locked in. The two interpretations coincide in the steady-state case that I will consider in the remainder of the paper with n = µ(n i + n j ).
Contract decision (compatibility).
One upstream firm contacts only one downstream firm and they sign a contract type c. Their strategy set is c = {F, TE, DE, UE, VI} where:
• F = freedom;
• TE = total exclusivity: the dealing pair can neither supply nor buy from other firms;
• DE = exclusivity at the downstream level: the retailer is tied to the manufacturer, while the latter can eventually supply other downstream firms;
• UE = exclusivity at the upstream level: the manufacturer supplies a single retailer that can eventually find inputs somewhere else;
• VI = vertical integration.
Each pair simultaneously decides which type of contract to sign. These are long-term contracts that specify the input supply relationship for both periods. On the other hand, contractual terms, such as payments, are determined only for the current period.
Remark. These contracts can be reinterpreted in terms of compatibility choices between producers of complementary goods. Freedom corresponds to perfectly compatible inputs, while total exclusivity corresponds to the decision to keep products incompatible. The analogy is exact if compatibility cannot be decided unilaterally but needs to be 'two-way'. This analogy reinforces the assumption on the long-term nature of contract types. Product design and compatibility (or their analogous vertical structure) are long-term decisions that cannot be changed in the short run. On the other hand, it is very difficult to commit to final and intermediate prices at the beginning of the game.
Hence input and final prices are determined separately in each period t = 1, 2.
Market competition. In each period, an input price has to be specified as well as final outputs. [ Figure 1 about here] Before solving this model, I want emphasize that transfers between retailers and suppliers are determined by Nash bargaining between the two parties, after the vertical contracts are in place.
The bargaining outcome must recognize the outside options of each party: these outside options are determined by the ability of the parties to trade with corresponding parties in the "other" vertical chain, and therefore by the relation-specificity of their vertical contracts. Hence the strategic considerations at the time of vertical contracting (t = 0). In particular, I will show that the transfer does not affect the analysis at t = 2 so that a pair always obtains the same joint surplus in equilibrium in the second period as an integrated firm. However, the value of the transfer does alter the incentive to attract customers at t = 1. The value of the transfer is calculated by examining the outside options that depend on both the contract initially chosen by the negotiating pair and the contract of the competing pair.
Market competition
Market competition at t = 2: 'reaping' customers and sharing the rents
Imagine that a generic pair (i + h) has signed a deal and denote by w i the input price faced by retailer i. The rival retailer faces a wholesale price w j that can be zero if the rival pair is integrated.
At t = 2 retailer i delivers a total quantity q i to the market of consumers free to switch so to maximize their profits taking input prices as given. If a total quantity q i + q j is sold to the new market of mass µ(n i + n j ), the individual quantity consumed has to be the ratio
, and this quantity is also consumed by each of the customers captive to firm i, whose total mass is (1 -µ)n i . Firm i solves the following problem:
The FOCs determine the following output rates and the corresponding price:
where K = b/(2 + µ). Notice that a simple interpretation emerges in case both pairs are integrated (w i = w j = 0), since equilibrium price and profit would simplify to:
The previous expressions indicate that the price is higher than the Cournot price b/3.
Looking at extreme cases, it becomes the monopoly price when µ = 0, i.e., when everybody is locked in so that monopoly power is fully exercised. On the other hand when µ = 1 we get the Cournot solution (all customers are free to switch retailers).
Wholesale prices and transfers are determined using Nash bargaining. 
It is useful to start the analysis with the following:
Lemma 1. The optimal input price for a bargaining pair is w i * = 0.
The proof is not reported here, but it simply comes from the fact that the FOC for joint profits is decreasing in wholesale price w i for all non-negative wholesale prices set by the rival pair.
The option to increase final price and soften market competition using a positive wholesale price is not used. This is contrary to the findings of Bonanno and Vickers (1988) who study the case of differentiated goods when firms compete in prices. Their result derives from the fact that the variables in their game are strategic complements, while my setting involves Cournot firms. There is always an incentive for a contracting pair to eliminate double marginalization, setting the input price equal to marginal cost. 11 Joint profits are:
Joint profit is increasing in the input price of the rival pair (w j ): as w j increases, the rival retailer produces less and less until it shuts down and the pair (i + h) monopolizes the remainder of the market, earning the amount corresponding to the second element in the brackets. The latter amount is also collected if the rival retailer is unable to strike a deal with its manufacturer. As Lemma 1 applies to both pairs, eq. (4) simplifies to:
where the second element is relevant only when the rival pair is unable to reach an agreement. Since agreements are reached in equilibrium, in the second period the total available surplus does not depend on the contract type. The "vertical externality" is eliminated by bargaining with side payments. However, the interplay between initial contracts chosen by the contracting pair and the rival determines the outside option and the division of surplus. The outside options for a contracting pair (thus excluding a VI pair) are derived from the possibilities reported in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
The entry 'Yes' means that the party has an alternative source of either supply or distribution in case of disagreement. The value zero in the brackets occurs when such an alternative is only virtual and the party involved cannot hope to make any money from that alternative partner. In case of disagreement, it can be seen that the manufacturer cannot hope to sell to the alternative retailer/retailing division and would always get zero. 12 It can also be realized that a retailer is in a better position than its contracting manufacturer when signing a deal. When both have a zero outside option, they would equally split the "pie" given by eq. (5), otherwise the retailer can get a higher share. This is a result of having 'downstream' switching costs. The exact value depends on the disagreement payoffs that are studied in the Appendix. There I prove the following:
Proposition 1. When a contracting pair (i + h) bargains at t = 2, it always obtains a total surplus of ) (
If any pair is TE, then the surplus is divided equally. This is also true if the pair is DE or if the rival is UE. In the other cases, retailer i gets the payoff shown in table 2 while manufacturer h gets the remaining part of surplus.
[ [ Table 3 about here]
Figure 2 is a graphical representation of Corollary 1. It is clear that VI implies that the full profit at t = 2 is taken into consideration by the retailing division, while in all other cases the weight is smaller since the retailer does not appropriate the entire surplus. It should be noted that freedom of both pairs gives high but not full incentives to the retailer. Freedom ensures that the retailer retains a fair share: the retailer, even in disagreement, has to be supplied by an alternative source. Incentives are still quite high (but lower than VI or (F, F)) if the retailer can be supplied by an alternative source that is not in a strong bargaining position in case of disagreement. This is why incentives are higher, for instance if a pair is UE and the rival is DE or F, as opposed to a rival that is VI.
Incentives are lowest when total exclusivity results either by contractual choice (TE) or de facto because of the rivals' choice: in these cases the retailer cannot sell in case of disagreement. It can also be seen that, when incentives depend on switching costs, they are increasing in the magnitude of switching costs: the retailer is in a stronger bargaining situation because it has a base of captive customers. When µ = 0 all customers are locked in, there is no competition between retailers, and it does not make any difference to bargain the outside option with an independent manufacturer or with the manufacturing division of an integrated rival. Because of this incentives are the same (3/4) independent of the contracts chosen. Finally, notice that if the rival is vertically integrated, incentives reach their minimum level (1/2) when µ = 1: goods are homogeneous and the retailer would get nothing from its outside option with an integrated pair that has no interest to supply a rival.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Market competition at t = 1: 'investing' in subscribers base I turn now to study market competition in the first period, e.g. when consumer buy the good for the first time. Recall that first vertical contract terms are established for the current period (e.g.
wholesale prices and franchise fees) and then retailers attract customers, taking as given the wholesale price they have bargained with their manufacturing partner. Retailers and/or retailing divisions maximize the following expression (δ is the discount factor between periods):
where w i is the non-negative wholesale price (when relevant) and s i is firm i's marginal incentive to build market share. The equilibrium is:
The incentive to attract customers is greater when period-2 profits are high (due to individual demand, switching costs or discount rate). The incentive increases with respect to the firm's own marginal incentive and decreases with respect to the rival's. It is highest when the firm is VI (s i = 1), and the rival pair has some deal resulting in complete exclusivity (s j = 1/2). The quantity in equilibrium also depends on intermediate prices that, in principle, may take different values according to the vertical structure chosen in the first period.
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Given the Cournot level of output for retailer i represented by eq. (7), the manufacturer sets supply equal to the final demand of his retailer. Finally, the wholesale price is determined by joint profit maximization of the contracting pair:
The FOC for the contracting pair (i + h) simplifies to:
where W = δK 2 . If the previous expression is negative for all w i > 0 and all s i and s j , then the wholesale price is set to zero, otherwise the wholesale price would be positive. Two features emerge from eq. (9). First of all, if competition was limited to the first period only (for instance, firms were myopic, hence W = 0), then we would get the equivalent to Lemma 1 also at t = 1: the "vertical externality" would also be eliminated in the first period, and all wholesale prices would be set to zero. However, the dynamic feature introduced by the multi-period nature of competition introduces an extra term in eq. (9). Hence, in principle, mark-ups could be introduced in period t = 1, not to reduce the intensity of competition in the current period but to affect profits in later periods. As joint profits in the second period are proportional to (n i + µn j ), a pair may want to set a particular wholesale price w i to influence both n i and n j . From eq. (7) it is clear that the own wholesale price has a negative impact on own customers but a positive impact on rival's customers.
If switching costs are high (µ low), then the interest lies only in attracting own customers and the dynamic feature reinforces the vertical externality. On the other hand, if µ is high, a pair may want to induce the rival's pair to attract many customers. This is accomplished by having a positive own wholesale price. This feature distinguishes VI from other contracts. The option to affect market competition via wholesale mark-ups in period 1 is available only to trading relationships other than VI. However, from eq. (9) it is apparent that this option is very rarely exercised: the extra term is also likely to be negative. In such cases, commitment to attempt to solve the dynamic inconsistency problem can arise only from the contract types rather from the contract terms. This is analyzed next.
Contract (compatibility) game at t = 0
In the previous sections, I derived equilibrium profits for manufacturers and retailers under various contractual configurations. These equilibrium outcomes are used to solve the contract game. Each contracting pair selects the contract type c i that maximizes joint profits, taking as given the contract c j of the other pair. The choice of a particular contract has two effects. On the one hand, it directly affects own incentives. On the other hand, by altering the outside option for the rival pair, it may also affect their division of rents and hence the marginal incentive of the competing retailer. Although contract choices arise from a discrete set, it is useful to see the impact that own and rival incentives have on the joint profits of a contracting pair. The full analysis is relegated to the Appendix where I
show that, when wholesale prices are set to zero, then the marginal impact of marginal incentives are:
There are two tendencies. As the derivative of joint profits w.r.t. s i is always positive, there is a tendency for firms to choose contract types that induce high-powered incentives. However the derivative w.r.t. s j has an ambiguous sign. A pair may want to distort own incentives as it can influence the rival's acquisition of market share in the first period.
Vertical integration is not allowed
Imagine first firms can write exclusive deals but are not allowed to be vertically integrated. The set of contracts available to the pair (i + h) is then c i = {F, DE, UE, TE}. 14 In the Appendix I show the following:
Proposition 2. When VI is not permitted, contracting pairs never exercise the option to set positive wholesale prices, unless both pairs are free and switching costs are not relevant (µ > 0.894).
Multiple equilibria arise in the contract game. Complete exclusivity/incompatibility, either contractual or de facto, is always an equilibrium, and is the unique outcome when switching costs are relevant (µ < 0.378). When switching costs are less relevant and second-period profits are relatively more important than first-period profits, then complete independence/compatibility (freedom) is also an equilibrium configuration and it Pareto-dominates complete or partial exclusivity/compatibility.
Remember that when VI is not permitted, the incentive s i can also depend on the contract chosen by the other pair (j + k). Conversely, the pair (i + h) can eventually influence s j . However, if a rival pair has decided to engage in a TE deal, incentives for a contracting pair are always set at 1/2, independent of the type of contract signed: hence total exclusivity for both pairs is always a trivial equilibrium contractual configuration.
Other equilibria can also appear, depending on the relevance of switching costs and are summarized in Figure 3a . The figure plots switching costs on the horizontal axis and the ratio W/a on the vertical axis. The latter can be interpreted as a measure of how much more important the future
is over the present (summarized by the demand intercept a in the first period). When switching costs are relevant, on top of (TE, TE), other exclusionary equilibria arise such as (UE, UE) or (UE, TE): in terms of outcome all these equilibria correspond to de facto total exclusivity. I
call complete exclusivity (CE) the equilibrium outcome produced by contracts that result in total exclusivity either de facto or by explicit contractual choice. Complete independence can arise in equilibrium. These outcomes are denoted by F (freedom). I should emphasize that freedom does not arise as an artifact of softened competition via positive wholesale prices. These occur only in the upper-right corner of Figure 3a , otherwise wholesale prices are set to zero and (F, F) arises purely for incentive reasons. This is an area where there is a 'double coincidence of wants': a pair benefits both from higher own incentives and from the rival's high incentives. Also notice how some range of parameters allow for interesting asymmetric equilibria denoted by PE (partial exclusivity), where one pair does not restrict the supply ability of the upstream firm and the other pair does not restrict the downstream firm's option to recur to an alternative supplier. 15 In Figure 3a , an additional exercise is also reported: complete exclusivity always arises in equilibrium, however, firms are caught in a prisoner's dilemma in the sense that they could be both better off by signing (F, F) contracts. This is always the case for all combinations of parameters above the lowest dotted line in the figure. In regions B and D where multiple equilibria arise, this result can be used to select (F, F) as the surviving equilibrium since it Pareto-dominates the other equilibrium configurations. Similarly, it can also be shown that in region C partial exclusivity Pareto-dominates CE.
[ Figure 3a -b about here]
Equilibrium contractual configurations when VI is permitted
In the previous section, I have shown how exclusivity contracts with very low-powered incentives always arise in equilibrium. When switching costs are relevant it is actually the unique equilibrium of the game. The previous result also implies that when future profits are sufficiently important, the equilibrium is very inefficient, in the sense that both firms would be better off if they could agree on In regions B, D and E there are asymmetric equilibria that involve partial exclusivity: one pair is integrated and the other pair signs UE deal (the retailer can be potentially supplied by the manufacturing division of the integrated rival).
Welfare considerations
In this section I discuss the welfare impact of contractual choices. I start by considering the "first best" that would be implemented by a benevolent social planner with discount factor δ. At t = 2 prices should be set at cost (zero), and each consumer would enjoy a surplus B FB = b 2 /2. The total benefit of a customer, at t = 1, would then be z + δB This first best cannot be implemented as switching costs make competition imperfect in later periods. Hence it is more relevant to look at the "second best" case, i.e. the optimal number of customers supplied subject to the pricing constraint arising at t = 2, given by eq. (2). The analysis is unaltered, with the exception that now the future benefit is B SB = (b -p) 2 /2 = (1 + µ) 2 K 2 /2 and the second best number of customers is n
The question that arises is the following: do firms choose contract types that are able to achieve the second best, or at least get close to it? From eq. (7) it turns out that the (private)
Comparing the private number of customers with the second best we obtain:
If the previous inequalities are satisfied, then there is private under-investment, despite the presence of switching costs. Indeed, if vertical integration is banned, the marginal incentives never exceed 3/4 (see table 3), hence the square bracket in the inequality above is always positive. The conclusion we can draw is that, if VI is banned, the second best is not achievable but the best contractual forms are those that provide the highest incentives to invest (complete freedom in this case). In terms of figure 3a, where CE emerges instead of F, then there could be a reason to ban forms of exclusivity as well. The reason for this is not related to typical foreclosure concerns (both pairs in fact produce in equilibrium), but rather to align the private and the social incentives to "invest" in subscribers.
The analysis is somewhat more involved when vertical integration is allowed (see figure 3b) .
First of all, the bracket in the inequality above is always positive when switching costs are not "too" high (µ > 2/ 3 -1 0.15): also in this case there is under-investment. Hence it does not seem a good idea to ban vertical integration: even if not a "perfect" solution since the two vertical chains are competing imperfectly against each other, the ability to integrate emerges as an equilibrium phenomenon and it pushes firms to move closer to the second best. When switching costs are very high (µ < 0.15), the same considerations still apply if ]
. It is only when both switching costs are very high and the future matters a lot that the last inequality is reversed and vertical integration may actually induce over-investment. Still, the policy conclusion is to allow vertical integration: if the only instrument available to the policy maker is the type of contracts available to a contracting pair (a plausible assumption compared to much more intrusive direct regulation such as setting the price), then a ban on VI in the region of parameters in question would be even worse as CE would arise instead. It is better to have a bit of over-investment with integrated pairs than a lot of under-investment with exclusivity deals.
Extensions Upstream consumer switching costs
In the model proposed in the previous sections, once a customer has bought a product, she is locked in with the retailer, as if the retailer 'owned' the customer. This is an important feature to determine the share of the profits accruing to retailers, using their ability to bargain with an alternative supplier. It can be argued that 'downstream' switching costs are fairly realistic in industries, such as mobile communications, where it is the service provider that bills the customer. The network operator has no means of direct access to its users (lack of customer details, less control over credit checking, difficulty in establishing a standard level of customer services). On the other hand, this modeling feature is not appealing when customers are locked in with the manufacturer, for instance because of brand loyalty (a relevant example could be the car industry). In this section, I would like to sketch the main differences arising once customers are 'owned' by manufacturers rather than retailers. [ Table 4 about here]
Turning to market competition at t = 1, in the Appendix I give the full characterization of the equilibria that may arise. If VI is not allowed, the unique outcome is complete exclusivity (CE) for any value of the parameters. This is because, in the presence of 'upstream' switching costs, retailers' incentives are higher when the manufacturer's ability to recur to an outside retailer is reduced.
Recalling from eq. (10) that joint profits increase with own incentives, CE arises in an attempt to give higher incentives to acquire market shares.
Compared to Figure 3a when customers are locked in with the retailers, the presence of 'upstream' switching costs makes F and PE equilibria disappear. In the previous case, complete independence would arise in the upper-right part of the figure, when both pairs benefit from high own and rival's incentives. The same mechanism is at work, with the difference that incentives are highest for both pairs under complete exclusivity, either contractual or de facto.
A similar qualitative difference between 'upstream' and 'downstream' switching costs also arises if contracting pairs are allowed to integrate. When switching costs are high, then VI is the unique equilibrium as before (this roughly corresponds to region A in Figure 3b ). There is still an intermediate region with asymmetric equilibria that involve partial exclusivity. The main difference emerges when switching costs are not too relevant and the future matters: now, the unique outcome is complete exclusivity, while before we had independent pairs. In conclusion, this analysis says that when consumer switching costs are high, their nature does not influence the type of equilibrium outcomes (CE if integration is not allowed, otherwise VI). On the other hand, whether switching costs are related to retailers or to manufacturers matters if switching costs are mild (F structures should arise in the former case, while CE in the latter).
Consumer rational expectations
In the previous analysis I have considered the case of myopic customers. This was a simplifying assumption that may not apply in markets with more sophisticated consumers that anticipate future prices when they make subscription decisions. In the model description I also claimed that the exogenous parameter µ could be interpreted as the fraction of either customers without switching costs or period-1 users that leave the market and are replaced by uncommitted customers in period 2. This analogy has to be qualified once customers have rational expectations. Let µ 1 denote the fraction of customers that 'die' (leave the market) and are replaced by an equal mass of uncommitted customers. Let also µ 2 be the fraction of customers that stay in the market and are uncommitted at t = 2, with µ = µ 1 + µ 2 . Clearly, the remaining fraction 1 -µ is made of period-1 customers that do not leave the market and are locked in at t = 2.
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Consumers anticipate that at t = 1 they will enjoy a discounted future benefit B = 2 / ) 1 )( 1 (
where δ c is the consumer discount factor. Hence the price in period 1 is p = a + B -(n i + n j ). Equilibrium quantities and price in the first period turn out to be:
Compared to the previous analysis, which implicitly assumed δ c = 0, more customers are attracted in the first period. However the equilibrium price is not reduced since rational expectations make demand less elastic. To understand what happens in terms of contractual choice, it can be shown that the derivatives of joint profits with respect to own and rivals' incentives to attract customers are modified as follows: 
Rational expectations produce two effects. One, they induce a pair to select a contract that provides high own incentives, and two, a pair would also like to exert a negative influence on the rival's incentives. The overall effect depends on the values taken by the parameters. The intuition is that rational expectations shift the demand function upwards in the first period, as customers anticipate that they will enjoy some future benefits. From eq. (12) it is clear that part of this extra surplus is appropriated by the firms. Customers are then particularly profitable in the first period, so that each pair wants to attract more customers via high own incentives. For a given level of µ, effects are magnified when µ 1 is low. In other words, rational expectations play a bigger role when customers stay in the market and are uncommitted between periods, rather than die at the end of the first period. In fact, when there is a high probability of dying between periods (high µ 1 ) then customers care most about the first period and competition intentifies.
If all surviving period-1 customers are locked in period 2 (µ 2 = 0 and µ = µ 1 ), then the additional effects in eq. (13) disappear when switching costs are low, whereas it has a relevant impact when switching costs are high. Equilibria are similar to those described in Figures 2a and 2b .
In particular, very little changes in the right-had sections of the diagrams (in the limit, nothing changes when µ = 1), whereas regions A's extend their domain further to the right. Qualitatively, the same type of equilibria emerges, with the difference being that the range of CE equilibria (when VI is not allowed) and VI equilibria (when VI is allowed) is now extended.
It is also interesting to note the case when no period-1 customer leaves the market (µ 1 = 0 and µ = µ 2 ). In this situation the effects from rational expectations are magnified. In particular, if consumers and firms have the same discount factor (δ c = δ) and VI is not allowed, the regions with partial exclusivity disappear (regions C and D in terms of Figure 3a) . CE is the unique equilibrium 'almost' everywhere (calculations show that F can be an equilibrium only when switching cost are almost nil, µ > .966). When integration is allowed, then VI is the unique equilibrium everywhere. It should also be noted that the ability to integrate would not necessarily solve the prisoner's dilemma. In the model I have proposed, all the action results from different incentives to build market shares that are associated with various contractual arrangements. If vertical integration is banned for anti-trust reasons, then firms would engage in very extreme forms of exclusive dealerships as a way of sufficiently investing in a base of repeat purchasers. However, these contracts disappear when integration is allowed. On the other hand, when future profits are more relevant than present ones, and lock in effects are mild, independent manufacturers and retailers are an equilibrium outcome that survives even if integration is an option. Vertical integration turns out to be good for welfare because this vertical structure provides high-powered incentives to invest in customer base. This arises endogenously when switching costs are high, although firms may be caught in a classic prisoner's dilemma. However, if vertical integration is not allowed for antitrust reasons (or too costly for technological reasons), then there is a case for fighting exclusionary contracts as well.
I have also discussed how the results would change if customers are locked in with manufacturers rather than with retailers. This has produced the following empirical predictions: A) integrated structures are expected when switching costs are high (or complete exclusivity if integration is banned), independent from the fact that consumers are locked in with the retailer or with the manufacturer; B) industries with mild switching costs would not adopt integrated structures even if the policy maker allows it. In particular, in case B we have two contrasting predictions according to the nature of switching costs: B1) independent firms would emerge if switching costs are downstream; B2) exclusivity contracts should arise if they are upstream.
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The model that I have proposed illustrates an interesting economic idea, which is based on a special formulation. It is hoped that this study will further stimulate investigation in this field. For instance, the set of contracts considered is quite rich but does not exhaust all possible vertical configurations. Any restriction on the set of possible contracts is not always innocuous, and may influence the equilibrium contract choice even if the omitted contracting possibilities are not visited at equilibrium. I have also assumed that a manufacturer and a retailer are exogenously matched at the beginning of the game. This was needed to analyze the intricate double Nash bargaining game with endogenous outside options. Relaxing this assumption is an opportunity for further research.
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In this paper I have explicitly taken the view that switching costs are more 'primitive' than vertical relationships. In this respect, one could question the cause-effect relationship of the main finding of this paper, i.e., the higher the switching costs, the greater the degree of exclusivity.
Alternatively, it could be argued that only exclusive retailerships induce retailer-specific switching costs. In this sense, it may be the nature of vertical contracts that endogenously determine the magnitude of product switching costs.
Endnotes
1 See Klemperer (1995) and Farrell and Klemperer (forthcoming) for surveys of recent work.
2 Surveys can be found in Katz (1989) , Irmen (1998) and Rey and Tirole (forthcoming).
3 Notice that the framework that I employ can be re-interpreted to analyze compatibility rather than contractual choices. Imagine a final product is made of two components. The combined product is sold in a market where there is an alternative combined product and where customers face switching costs. The trade-off between low current prices and high future prices is then the same as above and it is influenced by the way a pair of firms shares the surplus extracted from customers. Such a share will depend on the outside options available to the two parties, i.e., whether a component can be combined with alternative components produced by rivals.
According to this interpretation, an incompatible product design corresponds to an exclusivity clause in a vertical contract. 4 Of course, each one of the previous examples also includes unique features. For instance, in the case of medical services, the situation is complicated by the fact that plans are often arranged by employers. In the case of photocopiers, leveraging and foreclosure may be the most important concerns (think of the famous 1992 Supreme
Court case in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Service Inc.). In the case of video games, both direct and indirect network externalities are crucial. I will not attempt to cover all these additional features.
5 In section 5.2 I discuss rational expectations.
6 Notice that the unit bundle purchase in t = 1 followed by multiple unit consumption in t = 2 is just the reduced form of a more complex environment where consumers have an identical downward sloping demand for the nondurable component in both periods, but must buy the durable component first. At t = 1 the durable part is sold at price p d and the non-durable goods are sold at a unit price p n . Consumer utility at t = 1 is z
consumers are identical with respect to the non-durable component but heterogeneous with respect to a fixed level of utility z they get from consuming the whole bundle, where z is uniformly distributed on a support with upper limit α. Under many model specifications, firms would set p n at the marginal cost (here normalized to zero) as this is efficient and they have another instrument (the durable) to play with and win market shares. Hence, the total number of customers served in the first period determines the inverse demand function p d = α + b 2 /2 -(n i + n j ) which coincides with the previous one by simply setting α + b 2 /2 = a.
the-difference-rule" of Nash bargaining is also obtained with strategic bargaining with inside options; see Muthoo 1999).
11 In principle, a negative wholesale price would induce the exclusive retailer to sell even more than under vertical integration, hence committing the retailer to an aggressive behavior that is beneficial to the contracting pair. I do not allow for such negative prices. This could be relaxed without having to assume that such pricing gives rise to strategic agency effects at t = 2 by assuming instead that the wholesale price is unobservable to the other manufacturer-retailer pair. On the other hand, my assumption is crucial at t = 1 (see footnote 17 below). On the general problem of commitment in vertical chains, see Irmen (1998).
12 Disagreement payoffs are calculated taking as given the rival's agreed-upon contract. The rival retailer is already being supplied at marginal cost, hence the manufacturer in disagreement will never be able to obtain positive rents. However the manufacturer does get some profit when it strikes a deal with its retailing partner via the franchise fee. The zero outside option implies that the manufacturer gets less than 50% of the joint surplus created with the retailer (exactly 50% if the retailer also has a zero outside option). On the other hand, it is the rival retailer that can exploit the possibility of being supplied by another manufacturer and extract more rent from its own supplier.
13 It is useful to illustrate the case when both pairs are integrated. The price at t = 2 is p = K = b/(2 + µ), while it is p = (a -δK 2 )/3 at t = 1. Compared to the standard Cournot outcome, which is the reference point with no switching costs (µ = 1) and when firms are myopic (δ = 0), prices are lower in the first period because firms compete for market share that is valuable later. This effect depends on δK 2 and it becomes more important as the second-period profits become more relevant per se (high b), they are not discounted much (high δ), or derive from customers being locked-in (low µ).
14 This can derive from antitrust reasons and it corresponds, for instance, to the decision taken in the cellular telephony sector in the UK where from 1985 until 1993 the regulator required network operators to be structurally separated from their service providers. See Valletti (2000) for details.
15 Equilibria of this kind are given for instance by (UE, DE) or (UE, F). Recalling the analogy between exclusionary contracts and compatibility, CE corresponds to complete incompatibility, PE to partial compatibility and F to full compatibility. 16 All the fractions should be interpreted as probabilities; see Klemperer (1987) for further discussion.
17 VI would also be the equilibrium outcome if contracts over two-part input prices are unobservable (or equivalently they are set at the same time as final quantities) and input prices are allowed to be negative. Clearly, nothing would change with respect to the present analysis at t = 2. On the other hand at t = 1, when retailer i cannot observe w j , downstream quantities can respond to changes in their own input price only. Hence the retailer and the bargaining pair maximize the following expressions respectively where P(·) is a general demand function in the first period: 
If input prices cannot be set below zero, then the results of Sections 3 and 4 would be unchanged. On the other hand, if prices can be negative, then w i = -(1 -s i )δK 2 : contracts would not play any role and any pair would behave as an integrated firm.
18 A casual check of these predictions can be done returning to the examples presented at the very beginning of the paper. In telecoms, switching costs have been quite high -especially in the past in the absence of number portability. Vertical integration has been quite typical, unless regulators require structural separation. In U.K. 
Choice of contract type (compatibility)
Market competition:
Market competition: From table 1 it is immediate to see that when the outside options are zero for both i and h, then the "pie" is shared equally and s i = ½.
• Imagine the rival pair is VI. The only interesting cases arise if retailer i has signed either an F or a UE contract. In case of disagreement, i can contract with the manufacturing division of (j + k). If they agree, then the whole market is monopolized. If they disagree, i would get zero, while (j + k)
would still exert monopoly power over ) ( i j n n µ + customers. As a result, the independent retailer brings its customer base of captive customers and it gets half of the profit extracted from them:
, where x = {F, UE}.
• Imagine the rival pair has a DE deal and (i + h) have signed either a UE or a F deal. If (i + h) disagree, i can contract with k: they agree on a zero input price and on a share s* for k. Table A1 indicates the agreement and disagreement payoffs:
Since b = K(2 + µ), the extra surplus generated by an agreement can be rewritten as:
The rivals (j + k) have a DE deal, hence they would both get zero in disagreement, implying that s k = 1/2, and giving the following value for the outside option of i:
• Imagine the rival pair is F. In case of disagreement between i and h, the contracting game between k and i would give the same agreement and disagreement payoffs as in the previous case.
On the other hand, if (i + h) have a F deal, the disagreement payoffs of (j + k) change. In fact, j could be in principle supplied by h. By definition of an outside option, one can write for retailer i:
where S is given by eq. (A1) and it depends on s k = 1 -s j . Since the situation is symmetric, it is also possible to write an equation corresponding to eq. (A2) for retailer j. Solving the resulting 2 x 2 system in s i and s j , one directly finds the share of the equilibrium "pie" accruing to retailer i when both pairs have signed F contracts: Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the expression of the FOC for contracting pair (i + h) given by eq. (9) in the main text. Suppose first the wholesale price for retailer i is positive. For this to happen it has to be: Table A2 By inspecting table A2, it can be seen that:
• If a pair is TE, incentives for a rival pair are unaffected by the contractual choice. Hence (TE, TE) is always an equilibrium.
• If the rival pair is UE, then a contracting pair has its own marginal incentive fixed at 1/2, but it can still influence the rival's incentive. Eq. (11) is always negative when µ is sufficiently small. In such a case the best response is to give minimal incentives to the rival. This can happen under UE. Hence de facto complete exclusivity (arising from (UE, UE)) is an equilibrium for sufficiently small µ (calculations show that a sufficient condition is µ < .378).
• If the rival pair is DE, then the optimal response is always to set maximal own incentives, either with a F or a UE contract. Because of the previous result, de facto complete exclusivity (UE, DE) is an equilibrium only if switching costs are not too big.
• If the rival pair is F, then a contractual choice has a double effect: on the one hand, there is a tendency to have strong own incentives, pointing towards F as well. On the other hand, a pair can also influence the rival's incentive. When eq. (11) is positive (small switching costs and high future profits), then the two effects reinforce each other and (F, F) is an equilibrium. When (A7) is negative, the second effect can prevail over the first one (this is the case when the future is not very important -compare eq. (10) and eq. (11) as W goes to zero), ruling out independent pairs as an equilibrium. Calculations show that TE and DE are dominated respectively by F and UE. The comparison between the latter actions demonstrates that UE is the best response when switching costs are high and the future is not too important (a sufficient condition is µ < .409).
By using (A4) or (A5) for joint profits and the corresponding values for incentives, one can obtain the equilibrium contractual configurations drawn in Figure 3a . Using table A2, I call complete exclusivity (CE) any combination that gives the lowest incentives for firms (1/2, 1/2); freedom (F) when incentives are highest (a, a); and partial exclusivity (PE) the intermediate situation (1/2, b) when incentives are low for one pair and mild for the other. The equilibria drawn in Figure 3a are summarized as follows:
• In region A: CE = {(TE, TE), (UE, UE), (TE, UE), (UE, TE)};
• In region B: CE = {(TE, TE), (UE, UE), (TE, UE), (UE, TE)}; F = {(F, F)};
• In region C: CE = {(TE, TE)}; PE = {(UE, F), (F, UE), (DE, UE), (UE, DE)};
• In region D: CE = {(TE, TE)}; PE = {(UE, DE), (DE, UE)}; F = {(F, F)}.
Finally, profits under freedom are greater than under complete exclusivity when: The latter inequality is always satisfied in regions B, C and D, whereas in region A it defines the set of points where a prisoner's dilemma arises. To recapitulate, when multiple equilibria arise, in region B: F Pareto-dominates CE; in region C: PE Pareto-dominates CE; in region D: F Pareto-dominates both CE and PE.
Proof of Proposition 3. Imagine that pair (j + k) is integrated (i.e., w j = 0, s j = 1). The pair (i + h) has alternative options other than VI. After substituting the value for marginal incentives in eq. (A3), the RHS would always be negative. As a result, if a pair integrates then the other pair always set a zero wholesale price, and the expression for profits are given by eq. (A5). After substitution of the relevant incentives (see also 
, which is always satisfied for µ < .544, otherwise the best reply is either F or UE.
• If the rival pair is free, F is the best response for low switching costs (a necessary condition is µ > .573) and low values of a/W. UE is the best reply for very high switching costs. For intermediate values of the parameters, then VI is the best response.
• If the rival is TE, then VI is the best reply if a / W > (6µ− 5) / 2 , otherwise any other contract does better than VI.
• 
, which is always satisfied for µ < .717, otherwise the best reply is either F or UE.
• If the rival is UE, then VI is always better than low-powered contracts, and it is also better than F or DE for high switching costs (a sufficient condition is µ < .726), otherwise the best reply is either F or DE.
I do not report all the expressions, for the sake of brevity, but the analysis leads to the equilibria drawn in Figure 3b :
• In regions A1 and A2: VI = {(VI, VI)} (VI is a dominant strategy in region A2);
• In region B: PE = {(VI, UE), (UE, VI)};
• In region C: VI = {(VI, VI)}; F = {(F, F)};
• In region D and E: PE = {(VI, UE), (UE, VI)}; F = {(F, F)};
• In region F: F = {(F, F)};
• In region G: PE = {(UE, DE), (DE, UE)}; F = {(F, F)};
• In region H: CE = {(TE, TE)}; F = {(F, F)}.
The comparison of profits under integration, independence and exclusivity gives: Since Z 2 < 3µ < Z 1 , I can thus conclude:
• In regions A1 and A2 where (VI, VI) is the unique equilibrium, when a/W > 3µ the prisoner's dilemma remains and it is worsened by the ability to integrate. When Z 2 < a/W < 3µ the prisoner's dilemma remains but it is softened compared to CE. When Z 2 > a/W the prisoner's dilemma is eliminated.
